


























Emerging Markets Forum: 
 
International Capital Flows, Domestic Capital Markets, Growth and 




December 9-11, 2005 




Managing Capital Inflows: What Have We Learned 
Barry Bosworth 
The Brookings Institution 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the development of a global capital market with a 
larger role for capital flows to developing countries was a major objective of international 
economic policy. In fact, consideration was being given to making an open capital 
account a condition of IMF membership. However, a decade of frequent and very costly 
financial crises throughout Latin America and Asia has led to a reconsideration of that 
advice.  The experience also promoted an explosion of economic research to reexamine 
the tradeoff between the benefits and risks of international capital flows.  
The objective of this paper is to review that research and the policy advice that 
flows from it.  The paper provides a brief review of the recent pattern of capital flows to 
developing countries before turning to three substantive issues: (1) the impact of capital 
inflows on growth, (2) the role of domestic financial structure, and (3) the interaction 
between open capital markets and the exchange rate regime. 
First, it is surprisingly difficult to produce robust evidence of a strong relationship 
between integration with the global financial system and large net benefits to the 
participating countries.  The benefits accrue very gradually and can be wiped out for 
many years by the occurrence of a financial crisis.  The link between financial 
liberalization and crises is the major reason for the finding of limited net gains. 
Second, there is much greater appreciation of the linkage between domestic and 
external financial liberalization.  The two reforms need to be coordinated, but some 
analysts would go further in suggesting that external liberalization should be conditional 
on the achievement of certain minimal standards of liquidity and oversight in the 
domestic financial system. 
Third, the coordination of liberalization with changes in the exchange rate regime 
remains an area of significant dispute. There is agreement that a simple fixed rate system 
is too exposed to speculative pressures and leads to excessive levels of risk-taking in 
cross-border financing.  However, there is no agreement that the adoption of a flexible 
rate is sufficient to resolve the problems.  The level of foreign-currency debt is high even 
in flexible exchange rate regimes.  The issue of currency risk is also not adequately 
addressed in the Basel accords on bank supervision. 
The liberalization of the capital account is an inevitable by-product of economic 
growth and involvement in the global trading system.  The increasing complexity of 
international transactions will make controls ineffective, and their complexity will 
impose costs on other cross-border transactions.  However, the historical experience does 
suggest that countries are right to proceed with caution, and as an integral part of an 
overall program of reform of the domestic financial system and the exchange rate regime.  
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  The globalization of financial markets has proceeded at a rapid pace over 
the past quarter century, but it has been largely a phenomenon of increased interactions 
among the industrial countries. Capital inflows to industrial countries peaked at $4 
trillion in 2000, and are currently averaging in excess of $3 trillion per year.  Meanwhile 
capital flows to developing countries amounted to only a little over $400 billion at their 
peak in 1997, prior to the Asian financial crisis, and averaged less than $300 billion 
annually in 2001-2003 (figure 1). 
The disparity of capital flows in the 1980s and 1990s between industrial and 
developing economies led to an advocacy of a global market for financial capital and 
pressures on developing economies to speed up the process of removing controls on 
cross-border flows.  At one time, consideration was being given to making an open 
capital account a condition of IMF membership.  However, a decade of frequent and very 
costly financial crises throughout Latin America and Asia has led to a reconsideration of 
that advice.  The experience also promoted an explosion of economic research to 
reexamine the tradeoff between the benefits and risks of international capital flows.  This 
is an opportune time to review the results of the research and the policy advice. 
The case for expanding cross-border financial transactions is largely drawn from 
analogy to cross-border trade in goods and services.  By breaking the constraint that 
domestic investment is limited to the volume of national saving, capital inflows can be 
used to finance a more rapid pace of growth than a country could achieve on its own.  
And certainly there are historical examples, such as the United States, Canada, and 
Australia that achieved large gains from the use of foreign capital inflows.  In addition, it 
  1has been suggested that cross-border capital flows can be used to smooth the normal 
cyclical fluctuations in domestic demand. 
However, the examination of a broader set of experiences suggests that the social 
benefits of capital inflows to emerging markets are surprisingly limited, and the gains can 
be easily offset by the risks that they impose.  Because the costs are born by a few, there 
is also a divergence of interests among national governments in their advocacy of 
unfettered financial flows.  A group of industrial countries with highly sophisticated 
financial systems have pushed capital account convertibility on a number of countries 
who are still unprepared for such a step.  For example, the OECD imposes capital 
account convertibility as a condition of membership, and the United States held up the 
accession of China to the WTO until it could achieve a side agreement on a time table for 
U.S. financial firms’ access to China’s markets.   
The paper begins with a brief review of the recent growth performance of 
developing countries and the pattern of capital flows.  The first substantive objective of 
this paper is to provide a summary of the empirical research aimed at assessing the 
benefits and costs of capital flows to developing countries.  Second, the paper examines 
the role of domestic financial market structures and the exchange rate regime in 
accounting for the frequent association of capital account liberalization and financial 
crises.  The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy issues that arise in 
management of the process of opening an economy to foreign capital inflows.  
In summary, it is surprisingly difficult to produce robust evidence of a strong 
relationship between integration with the global financial system and large net benefits to 
the participating countries.  I do not believe, however, that we should conclude that 
financial integration should not be an objective of national policy.  The liberalization of 
the capital account is an inevitable by-product of economic growth and involvement in 
the global trading system.  The increasing complexity of international transactions will 
make controls ineffective, and their complexity will impose costs on other cross-border 
transactions.  However, the historical experience does suggest that countries are right to 
approach the process with caution, and with a clear recognition of the importance of 
integrating the liberalization of the external financial account with a program of domestic 
  2financial reform and liberalization.  They also need to recognize that an open capital 
account will have important implication for sustaining various exchange rate regimes.  
The OECD countries spread the process of liberalization over decades and experienced 
several large and costly failures.  The developing countries should learn from the 
historical experience and adopt a program of gradual and sequenced liberalization.  
 
Recent Performance 
It is useful to precede the discussion of international financial reform with a brief 
review of recent economic developments and trends in international financial markets.  
For more than a decade, the economic reform agenda has emphasized the importance of 
improved macroeconomic policies, both in the industrial and developing economies.  
Considerable progress has been made in reducing the magnitude of fiscal deficits, and 
inflation has declined substantially in most countries.  However, there is a perception that 
the benefits in terms of accelerated growth have been less than promised (Montiel and 
Servén, 2005). 
The economic growth performance of the high-income OECD countries and 80 
developing countries are compared in figure 2.  First, as shown in the top panel, a general 
slowing of economic growth since 1960 is a common phenomenon; but the 1980s were 
truly a lost decade from the perspective of most developing countries.  Growth did 
recover somewhat in the 1990s, but most developing countries are failing to narrow the 
gap with the rich economies.  One important qualification is that the picture of growth 
performance is significantly altered if we focus on the number of people rather than 
countries. Growth accelerated dramatically after 1980 in China and the Indian economy 
has been doing significantly better, and these are the world’s two most populous 
countries. 
 Second, developing countries have achieved a greater degree of economic 
stability, as illustrated in the lower panel.  The opportunity to use financial markets to 
smooth aggregate output and consumption spending is seen by some as an important 
motivation for more open international financial markets.  Unfortunately, it is not evident 
that a more open global system is the source of reduced volatility: many observers blame 
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world in recent decades.  Volatility has receded from the instability of the 1970s, but it 
remains about twice as high among developing compared to industrial countries. 
Inflation slowed among the developing countries, but again by less than in the 
industrial economies.   Fiscal deficits also declined across all groups of countries in the 
1990s.  In general, macroeconomic policies were less extreme, but the improvements in 
real income growth have been marginal.  
In contrast to the performance of output, financial flows to developing countries 
continue to be highly variable.  The balance of payments classifies capital inflows into 
three primary categories of foreign direct investment, portfolio capital, and other inflows.  
It is evident from figure 3 that the composition of inflows differs substantially between 
developing and industrial countries.   Foreign direct investment (FDI) is large in both 
cases, but it plays a far more dominant role in developing economies where it has 
accounted for about two-thirds of capital inflows over the past decade.  Portfolio 
investments also expanded in the 1990s, but stagnated after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis.  Other loans, principally bank lending and trade credit, have historical been 
important to developing countries, but such loans have also been the dominant source of 
instability.   After the 1997 financial crises, this category of lending to developing 
countries switched from a net inflow of $100 billion to a net outflow of an equal 
magnitude, and remained negative until 2003. 
A focus on private capital flows in the top panel of figure 4 more clearly 
highlights the dominant role of FDI, the declining significance of bank lending, and the 
gradual emergence of a significant amount of portfolio capital inflows.  All forms of 
investment however, were significantly curtailed by the Asian financial crisis.  A revival 
of gross inflows began in 2003 and has continued to the present. 
The regional distribution in the bottom panel shows the dominant role played by 
Latin America in the 1990s.  The three large countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico 
were the primary destination countries, until the Argentine crisis of 2001, which had 
strong contagion effects on all the other countries in the region.  The large inflow of FDI 
to China, beginning in the mid-1990s, camouflages the near complete termination of 
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high domestic saving rates, East Asia has never been as dependent as Latin America on 
capital inflows.  Most recently, the region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia has 
emerged as a third significant recipient of capital inflows. 
Finally, the following discussion focuses on the potential benefits of resource 
transfers from the high-income economies to the developing world.  Yet, we cannot help 
but note that the discussion takes place against the backdrop of a large resource transfer 
that is the reverse of the underlying assumption of this survey.  As shown in table 1, the 
United States is both the worlds richest economy and the net recipient of a resource 
transfer – a current account deficit -- that is now in excess of $700 billion and that is 
matched by a surplus in virtually every other major region of the world economy.  At 
present, the resource transfer is operating counter to the underlying assumption of much 
of the economic growth literature. 
 
Capital Inflows and Growth 
The frequency and magnitude of recent financial crises has opened a major debate 
about whether the benefits of international financial market integration are sufficient to 
offset the risks of severe financial disruption that can result with the sudden termination 
of capital inflows.  The benefits to developing countries are perceived to be concentrated 
in four areas.  First, by breaking the constraint of domestic saving as the limitation on 
investment, access to global financial markets expands the supply of capital.  By taking 
advantage of a more diversified international market, developing countries ought to 
obtain lower-cost financing of investment than is available in a closed domestic market.  
Growth can be enhanced without the need to reduce domestic consumption. 
Second, access to international markets allows domestic savers to achieve a 
higher level of risk diversification than is available locally and to smooth consumption by 
borrowing in ‘bad’ times and lending in ‘good’ times.  Obstfeld (1994) provided one 
perspective on the potential magnitude of these benefits by comparing the variability of 
national stock market returns with that of an optimally diversified international fund, 
suggesting that the gains could be very large.  At the same time, access to the 
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volatility of output changes.  Thus, several authors have suggested that it is important to 
distinguish between the volatility of consumption and output. 
Third, some advocates of liberalization perceive a particularly beneficial role for 
FDI.  By facilitating the transfer of managerial and technological knowledge, it may have 
additional positive effects on growth beyond the effects of greater capital accumulation 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  However, in some interpretations, the promotion of FDI 
is viewed as somewhat divorced from the issues of full capital account convertibility 
since most countries make special accommodations for providers of FDI. 
Finally, foreign capital inflows can enhance the domestic financial system by 
expanding the breadth and liquidity of markets and promoting greater competition among 
financial institutions (Levine, 2001).  In part, liberalization presumes that countries will 
permit the operation of foreign financial institutions in domestic markets.  
On the other side, the costs of financial integration primarily take the form of a 
greater risk of financial crisis.  One perspective was provided by Krugman (1979) who 
suggested that speculators could more easily exploit non-sustainable macroeconomic 
policies – fiscal-monetary polices that are inconsistent with a given exchange rate peg.  
The net effect could be a shifting of risk from foreign investors to domestic taxpayers and 
consumers with a consequent increase in consumption volatility.  In effect, policymakers 
are induced to follow policies that lead to large current account deficits that cannot be 
financed on a sustained basis.  Alternatively, Obtsfeld (1986) and others pointed to the 
dangers of induced liquidity crises due to a mismatch between short-term foreign 
liabilities and long-term domestic investments. 
Since the net benefits of financial integration appear ambiguous from a purely 
conceptual perspective, a substantial number of studies have attempted to evaluate the 
issue empirically.  Most recently, two studies review parts of the empirical literature to 
determine if any consensus has emerged about the net benefits: Edison and others (2004),  
and Prasad and others (2003).  Table 2 provides a list of the major studies as provided by 
Prasad and others (2003), plus two papers that were completed after their review, 
Eichengreen and LeBlang (2003) and Garcia and Santana (2004).  These studies 
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the correlation between variations in the degree financial integration and economic 
growth.  
The Prasad and others study concluded that the evidence of a positive association 
between financial integration and economic growth was weak and highly variable, a 
finding that was also supported by the review of Edison and others.  They also found 
little or no evidence that financial market integration has helped developing countries to 
stabilize fluctuations in consumption, and they argue that some of the evidence suggests 
capital flows to these countries may actually be pro-cyclical.  The situation stands in 
significant contrast to assessments of empirical work on trade liberalization, where the 
consensus argues that liberalization has promoted growth.  The weak supporting evidence 
is one factor that has led the IMF and others to back off on their prior strong advocacy of 
a rapid opening of capital accounts.  
However, the empirical studies do face considerable statistical problems.  First, it 
is difficult to agree on a measure of capital account openness. De jure measures are 
intended to capture the existence (and degree) of capital controls – in other words, a 
measure of each country’s official policy towards capital flows.  These indicators rely on 
information collected by the IMF on the existence of controls on capital flows. The 
empirical studies have relied on two versions.  The first is a simple categorical value of 
whether inflows were subject to restrictions.  A more nuanced measure was developed by 
Quinn (1997) and attempts to report degrees of openness.  Some critics have pointed out 
that the de jure measures sometimes do not reflect the reality of a country’s situation.  As 
such, they are measured with considerable error and impart a bias in the statistical studies 
toward a finding of no association. 
In contrast, de facto measures are intended to capture the actual amount of 
financial integration, using various indicators of capital flows.  The de facto measures do 
identify the countries that do or do not receive capital inflows; however, they are clearly 
endogenous to the process determining capital inflows, making it difficult to establish the 
direction of causation.  Do countries grow faster because of the capital inflows or does 
capital flow to the fast-growing countries?  The choice between the de jure or de facto 
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measure providing less unanimity of the results than suggested by the Prasad and others 
study. 
Most of the studies have been based on cross-national data sets in which the 
average rate of output growth over a period of time (decade) is related to the degree of 
capital market openness.  However, cross-national differences in economic growth also 
reflect differences in a large number of other determinants, such as physical and human 
capital accumulation, institutions, and openness of the trade regime,   while the studies 
include measures of these other factors, it can be very difficult to discern the influence of 
any one, particularly if it is measured with error. 
An alternative approach relies on the development of panel data sets that include 
the variations over time in output growth and its determinants within each country as well 
as the cross-national differences.  Such multi-dimensional data sets are time-consuming 
to construct, and have been attempted in only a few cases.  However, by excluding the 
cross-national variations with its complexity of determinants, it is possible to examine 
changes in growth and the degree of capital openness over many years and for many 
countries.   
The Garcia and Santana study is the most recent to use panel data.  Their sample 
was based on 51- industrial and emerging market countries over the period of 1970-2000.   
They used the Quinn measure of capital openness and a variety of different estimation 
measures to deal with the statistical problems.  Their study provides more favorable 
evidence about the positive benefits for economic growth of an open capital account.  
More specifically, they found that the positive contribution of FDI exceeded that of a rise 
in domestic saving, supporting the notion of significant spillover effects. 
A contrasting study by Eichengreen and Leblang analyzed the performance of 21 
countries over a period extending back to 1880, and 47 countries over the interval of 
1975-95.  They find that countries with capital controls actually grew faster than with 
open capital accounts.  They argued for an interpretation in which the benefits of capital; 
account liberalization are likely to dominate when the domestic financial system is robust 
and the international financial system is not prone to costly and disruptive crises.  Thus, 
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the domestic financial system.  However, the conflicting conclusions of the studies 
illustrate the ambiguity of the evidence and its sensitivity to variations in data and 
specifications. 
Given the previously-mentioned complexity of the growth process and the lags 
between changes in some of the determinants and their impact, it may be that the effects 
of capital inflows are lost amidst all the noise.  Since the primary effects of the inflows on 
growth are expected to operate through the support for higher rates domestic investment, 
some studies have carried out a more limited agenda of exploring the link between the 
various forms of capital inflows and domestic investment.  Bosworth and Collins (1999) 
found a positive and significant correlation between FDI and domestic investment, and 
between bank lending and investment, but no correlation with inflows of portfolio capital.  
The World Bank (2001) reported similar finding, but also reported a stronger relationship 
between longer-term capital inflows and investment. 
Other assessments of the costs and benefits of financial market openness have 
relied on case studies of individual countries or detailed reviews of the role of cross-
border capital flows in specific financial crises.  These studies often yield a more nuanced 
conclusion in which the effects of external financial liberalization are conditional upon 
the state of the domestic financial markets. The result is that the opening of financial 
markets is now put in the context of a sequence of financial reforms that assigns a priority 
to the establishment of stable domestic financial markets and institutions. 
Overall, them major impact of the empirical studies of the last decade has been to 
scale expectations with regard to the benefits of financial market integration and to inject 
a note of greater caution.  In a large number of past situations, the costs of a resulting 
financial crisis overwhelmed the benefits.  The confirmation of positive benefits is 
strongest for FDI, and the empirical tests do suggest that it augments national saving and 
leads to a higher level of domestic investment.  The interaction between multinational 
and local firms is an important part of the gains – access to global markets, linkages to 
improvements in business practices, and use of advanced technologies. 
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There is a weaker association with investment and growth, but some evidence that 
portfolio inflows expand the liquidity of domestic financial markets.  The most 
problematic net benefits are associated with bank lending.  While there is a positive 
association with increased investment in normal times, it has become clear in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis that bank loans – particularly, those that were 
denominated in a foreign currency – play a central role in encouraging excessive risk.  
Cross-border bank loans tend to be very pro-cyclical and most prone to flight in the 
aftermath of a crisis. There are normally denominated in a foreign currency and appear to 
generate the greatest expectation of a government bailout in the event of a crisis. 
 
The Order of Financial Liberalization 
Over the past two decades, the most costly currency crises -- those that involved 
substantial output losses -- were linked to serious problems in the domestic financial 
system.  In fact, there are relatively few currency crises with serious output losses that did 
not involve an associated financial crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) found that 
banking crises were much more likely in the period following financial liberalization 
programs, and in more than half the cases a banking crisis was followed by a currency 
crisis.  
The disruption of Asian currency markets was not preceded by widespread bank 
runs: but the most severely impacted economies had experienced problems with their 
banking systems for years, and they were in the midst of significant programs of financial 
reform and liberalization, associated with the move to full convertibility for the capital 
account.  Liberalization of the system also creates opportunities for excessive risk taking 
by inexperienced bankers supervised by inexperienced regulators. Even in the absence of 
a crisis, a weak banking system is likely to limit the ability of the central bank to raise 
interest rates to defend the currency. In this respect, the interest rate increases in the 
affected Asian economies were surprisingly modest relative to prior crises in other 
countries: they put up only a limited battle before allowing their currencies to depreciate.
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to liberalize the external financial account with a program of domestic financial reform 
and prudential oversight.  Domestic financial institutions are often unprepared to deal 
with the volatility, complexity, and risks inherent in cross-currency transactions.  While 
prior discussions had emphasized the importance of the financial system for mobilizing 
saving and efficiently allocating it among alternative investments, the more recent 
research highlights its role in the provision of information, corporate control, and the 
management of risk.  This suggests greater emphasis on promoting the development of 
financial markets rather than relying solely on banks.   
Much of the research on the interaction between the state of the domestic 
financial system, capital account liberalization and economic growth has been based on 
individual country studies – particularly countries that have been through a crisis.  One 
exception has been the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (199) who explored the 
interaction between domestic banking crises and currency crises. They found that  
currency crises were often preceded by a banking crises, and that the currency crises 
often deepened the banking crises, creating a vicious spiral. In addition, actions to 
liberalize capital flows often preceded the banking crisis. 
While there has been considerable discussion of the relative merits of bank-based 
versus market-based financial systems, much of the empirical research suggest that the 
distinction is not critical, and the benefits to growth are associated with higher levels of 
overall financial sector development, rather than its composition.  This conclusion is 
emphasized by Levine (2000) who analyzed the relationship between differences in 
cross-national growth rates and a wide range of indicators of financial market 
development.  At the same time, rising levels of economic development will lead to a 
gradual shift to greater reliance on markets.  Markets are seen as a mechanism for 
enhanced liquidity and transparency, crucial aspects of the effort to improve financial 
stability and avoid crises, even if they don’t contribute directly to growth.  Furthermore, 
the development of the financial system is often a proxy for other aspects of the 
institutional environment that influences growth – the legal system, absence of corruption, 
good government.  The interpretation of the empirical correlation between growth and 
finance is not very clear.  
  11There is also a greater appreciation of the importance of developing expertise in 
the supervision and regulation of financial institutions.   Effective regulation requires a 
focus on the provision of information to market participants, a commitment to the 
enforcement of contracts, and effective procedures for resolving insolvencies.  This 
implies the existence of disclosure and accounting standards as the primary basis for a 
credible information system.  By focusing on the promotion of greater transparency and 
information, government regulators will find that private agents provide much of the 
enforcement. 
Recognition of the importance of a strong domestic financial system and effective 
regulatory oversight does not translate, however, into agreement on the sequencing of 
external liberalization and domestic financial reform.  Some observers draw the 
conclusion that external liberalization should be conditional upon progress in reform of 
the domestic system.  Others suggest that the process of creating an effective regulatory 
environment is highly problematic and likely to involve long lags.  They propose instead 
that the external liberalization should be accelerated in order to import a more efficient 
domestic system by encouraging the participation of foreign institutions. 
Finally, some analysts view the financial crises as reflections of a weak policy 
commitment in countries where the authorities move too quickly to provide liquidity and 
protect domestic firms in a crisis, creating significant problems of moral hazard among 
those who anticipate a bailout.  They suggest the need to import external discipline by 
such measures as currency boards or the formal adoption of the dollar as a substitute for 
the national currency.  A few even suggest the purposeful promotion of foreign short-
term debt, strengthening the commitment of officials by raising the costs of failure.  Such 
a proposal is at sharp variance with those who see short-term foreign debt as a primary 
cause of the crises. 
    All of these concerns have lead many of the researchers who are focused on the 
international economy to qualify their prior strong support for open capital markets.  It is 
now perceived as a beneficial goal that should be carefully staged and coordinated with 
growth in the domestic financial system.  Countries should not open their external capital 
account until they have achieved certain minimum standards of performance with respect 
to the quality of the domestic financial institutions.   
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Capital Inflows and the Exchange Rate Regime 
A substantial portion of the risk or costs of an opening of the capital account arise 
out of interactions between external capital flows and exchange rate policies in increasing 
the potential for financial crises.  For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, some Latin 
American countries used exchange-rate targeting as part of an anti-inflation policy.  An 
over-valued exchange rate was the frequent result, and officials would delay corrective 
action because of fears of reigniting inflation.  High domestic interest rates, associated 
with the anti-inflation program, encouraged capital inflows, but investors were also intent 
on trying to predict the timing of the exchange rate correction.  The result was the 
frequent emergence of unsustainable combinations of interest rates and exchange rates in 
which the primary focus of investors/speculators was to guess the timing of the 
adjustment. 
Asian governments also chose to tie their currencies to the dollar both as anchor 
for their own price level and out of concern for their competitive position vis-à-vis 
neighboring countries.  In addition, domestic interest rates were well above international 
levels.  When combined with fixed exchange rates, interest rates differentials create a 
strong incentive to borrow abroad and lend domestically: banks believe that they have 
found a ‘money machine.’ The option was particularly tempting to Korean institutions in 
the mid 1990s with access to extremely low interest rates in Japan.  
Developing countries find it virtually impossible to borrow in their own currency, 
creating a larger risk. Eichengreen and others (2005) document that less than one percent 
of the international bonds of developing countries are denominated in their own currency, 
compared to over 50 percent for the major financial-center countries.   McKinnon (2005) 
published data on cross-border bank liabilities showing that 75 percent of the loans were 
denominated in the Dollar or the Euro and 90 percent was denominated in just five 
currencies.  Goldstein and Turner (2004) produced a more complete measure of the 
currency mismatch by taking account of the currency denomination of other elements of 
countries’ balance sheet. Mismatched and unhedged currency positions of both banks and 
enterprises were a major factor behind the East Asia crisis.  It is also very reminiscent of 
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Governments can offset the currency exposures by hold larger volumes of reserves in the 
foreign currency, but that is a costly policy that eliminates any net inflow of resources. 
The risks were made even greater when foreign lenders, responding to their own 
risk concerns and what they believed to be the lessons of lending in Latin America in the 
1980s, insisted on short maturities and often included provisions allowing them to recall 
loans on short notice.  On the basis of data from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), outstanding bank loans to Asia increased from $110 billion at the end of 1990 to 
$190 billion in 1993; but then surged to over $360 billion by the end of 1996.  Of total 
loans outstanding of $390 billion in mid-1997, two-thirds had a maturity of one year or 
less.  Dadush and others (2000) also documented the volatility of the loans when they 
found that an inflow of short-term debt to developing countries of $44 billion in 1997 
turned into an outflow of $85 billion in 1998.  In some cases, nonfinancial firms also 
viewed foreign currency loans as a lower-cost alternative to domestic borrowing.  The 
result was the buildup of a large amount of foreign-currency debt of which the 
supervisory authorities were unaware. 
The study of Eichengreen and others (2005) also demonstrated an increased level 
of foreign-currency debt for countries that maintain fixed exchange rate regimes.  The 
data suggest that a fixed-exchange rate regime leads the borrowers to underestimate the 
risk of foreign-currency debt, although it is equally plausible that high levels of foreign 
debt exposure make governments less willing to allow exchange rate changes.  However, 
the shift in recent decades toward more flexible exchange rates has not been enough to 
eliminate the problem.  Countries with highly flexible exchange rates continue to rely on 
foreign-currency denominated debt. 
Goldstein and Turner suggest that a move to a more flexible exchange rate system 
would create greater awareness of the currency risk and private incentives to limit it.  
However, they also recommend the collection and regular publication of data on currency 
mismatches for major sectors of the economy, and an active supervision and monitoring 
of the currency exposure of banks and their customers.  They would like to discourage 
  14government borrowing in a foreign currency and propose that the IMF adopt a harsher 
policy of limiting the extension of credit in such cases. 
  15The research has demonstrated that the combination of a fixed exchange rate 
regime and open capital flows can create severe hazards of currency mismatches in 
private and public financial arrangements.  However, there is no consensus that the 
adoption of a flexible exchange rate policy alone is an adequate response.  Most analysts 
see a continuing need for an active monitoring program and advocating a more managed 
exchange rate system combined with substantial reserve holding. 
 
The Policy Implications 
  The Asian financial crises of 1997-98 had profound effects on the debate 
over financial policy.  On the one hand they vividly illustrated the importance of getting 
it right, but they also pointed to problems with some of the doctrinaire approaches to 
financial liberalization.  There has been a strong turn away from ‘big bang’ notions of 
liberalization; but there is also a clearer understanding that the older policies of financial 
repression, the fixing of interest rates below market levels and controlling the allocation 
of credit, are also not sustainable.  Both the World Bank and the IMF have greatly 
expanded their financial sector research programs to provide greater guidance on optimal 
reform policies and the appropriate sequencing.   On the domestic side, they emphasize 
the development of private financial institutions and expanded competition.  In addition, 
the regulatory system should seek to expand the role of the market and avoid the 
elements of financial repression.  In large measure this translates into an emphasis by the 
regulators on transparency and expansion of information to market participants.  Finally, 
they have stressed the establishment of oversight systems to monitor and report currency 
mismatches.  
  On the external side, the move to more open financial markets will push 
countries toward more flexible exchange rate regimes to increase the private sector 
awareness of the risks of currency mismatches and to create incentives to reduce them.  
However, during the transition, some countries have combined a policy of larger reserve 
accumulation with direct controls on foreign-currency debt. 
  In their efforts to manage capital inflows, emerging market economies will 
have to choose among three policy options: (1) a larger current account deficit through 
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through direct controls, a tax, or a widening of the exchange rate band; or (3) offsetting 
capital outflows either through reserve accumulation or the promotion of private-sector 
outflows. 
Capital flows from the high-income countries to developing economies are 
usually advocated as part of a growth strategy in which larger flows of capital to the latter 
will support a faster rate of economic growth.  However, not all developing countries 
believe that they need additional capital inflows – that capital is a constraining influence 
on their growth.  Many East Asian economies have been able to generate adequate rates 
of saving domestically and fear the excessive pressure on asset markets that might 
accompany additional inflows.  China is an example of a high-saving country that 
struggles to absorb the foreign capital inflows.  Low-saving rate countries, however, can 
potentially benefit from using a current account deficit to sustain a higher rate of 
domestic investment and growth. 
Concern with excessive magnitudes of capital inflows has led some countries to 
recycle the surplus funds back into the global market.  In the short run, the simplest 
means of achieving that objective has been to accumulate reserves and invest the funds 
back into the financial markets of the major currency centers.  That is the current policy 
of China and India, for example.  It is also evident from figure 5 that the developing 
countries have substantially increased their reserves since the early 1990s and the trend 
appears to have accelerated after the 1997-98 financial crises.  In part, this may reflect an 
unwillingness to accept the implication for trade of allowing the inflows to pass through 
into a larger current account deficit.  But it also reflects a desire to hold a larger level of 
reserves as protection against the currency crises and sudden stoppages of the inflows 
that became so common in the 1990s.  Traditionally, countries assumed that the IMF 
would provide such protection; but the Fund’s repeated failure to provide sufficient 
assistance in a timely fashion, and the imposition of an increasing number of conditions 
on the support that it did offer have led countries to accumulate their own reserves.  The 
policy can be costly, however, as countries are unlikely to earn a return on the reserves 
sufficient to cover the cost of obtaining the funds.  
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private investors.  This is part of the general move to full capital convertibility, but there 
is a concern that the outflows may become excessive in times of crisis. An intermediate 
policy is that of Singapore, where the authorities nationalized the national saving system 
(provident funds) and managers invested the funds in a diversified range of foreign 
investments (McKinnon, 2005).  Singapore approach has the advantage of deflecting 
much of the political criticism associated with reserve accumulation. 
  The third option is to impose restrictions on capital inflows and divert the 
potential capital inflows.  This is the position discussed earlier in which the authorities 
judge that the costs of a potential currency crisis exceed the potential benefits, and reject 
capital account convertibility.  It is likely to be only a transitional policy, useful during 
the period of developing a more efficient and liberalized domestic financial system.  The 
controls become increasingly ineffective as the financial system grows in sophistication.  
Most of the proposals fro capital controls envision that they will be temporary; and that 
they will focus on foreign-currency denominated debt, on the grounds that FDI and 
equity investment raise fewer  issues of instability.  But also, some allowance must be 
made for trade credit.  As a result, it can be difficult to distinguish among financial 
transactions. 
At present, the international analysis does not provide strong answers about what 
combination of policies is best for managing capital inflows.   It is likely that the 
appropriate mix will be unique to the individual national situation.  At the same time, the 
lack of strong evidence concerning the economic benefits of capital inflows suggests that 
countries can afford to be cautious and ensure that the move to capital convertibility is 
integrated with the reform and liberalization of the domestic financial system. 
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Industrial CountriesFigure 2. Trends in Growth and Volatility, 1961-2000
Source: World Development Indicators, 2005. Developing Country measures based on 80 
countries with data extending back to 1961.
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INVESTMENTFigure 4. Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries by Type and Region, 1970-2004
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance
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investmentTable 1.  Summary of Payments Balances on Current Account
(Billions of US dollars)
2004 2005
Country/Region
United States -668.1 -759.0
Advanced economies (excl. U.S.) 444.3 290.8
Euro area 46.7 23.7
Japan 172.1 153.1
Other advanced economies  135.3 36.0
Newly industrialized Asian economies 90.2 78.0
Emerging market countries 227.7 410.1
Africa 0.6 12.5
Central and Eastern Europe -50.1 -35.1
Commonwealth of Independent States 63.1 105.3
Developing Asia 93.0 109.7
China 68.7 115.6
India -0.8 -13.5
Middle East 102.8 217.6
Western Hemisphere 18.3 21.5
Residual 3.9 -58.1
Source: World Economic Outlook, September 2005, IMF Table 2. Summary of Recent Research on Financial Integration and Economic Growth  
 Study  
 Number of 
Countries    Years Covered    Effect on Growth  
 Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994)    20    1950-89    No effect  
 Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995)    61    1966-89    No effect  
 Quinn (1997)    58    1975-89    Positive  
 Kraay (1998)    117    1985-97    No effect / mixed  
 Rodrik (1998)    95    1975-89    No effect  
 Klein and Olivei (2000)    Up to 92    1986-95    Positive  
 Chanda (2001)    116    1976-95    Mixed  
 Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001)    51-59    1973-92    Mixed  
 Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001)    30    1981-97    Positive  
 Edwards (2001)    62    1980s    No effect for poor countries  
 O'Donnell (2001)    94    1971-94    No effect, or at best mixed  
 Reisen and Soto (2001)    44    1986-97    Mixed  
 Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk (2002)    Up to 89    1973-95    Mixed  
 Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sløk (2002)    57    1980-2000    No effect  
Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) 21 1880-97 Negative
Garcia and Santana (2004) 51 1970-2000 Positive.
 Source: Prasad and others (2003), and author's additions.Source: World Bank, World Development Inidicators, 2005.
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